George Vassilev

IAS 102

Prof. B. Crawford

GSI: N. Biziouras

12.09.2002

War in the Balkans: Why did it not Spread to all Former Yugoslav Republics

TABLE OF CONTENTS:

I. Structure and Methodology:

1. Observation Abstract

1.1  Setting the puzzle

1.2  Bosnia and Herzegovina

1.3  Macedonia

2. Dependent Variable
3. Independent Variables:

 3.1. "No Place for You Here" Political Entitlement Hypothesis

a) hypothesis

b) graphical representation

c) theoretical basis

d) falsifiability

 3.2. "Pare Nema, Deistvai!" Economic Hypothesis ("There is no Money, Act!", Macedonian)

a) hypothesis

b) graphical representation

c) theoretical basis

d) falsifiability

 3.3. "Across the Border" International Relations Hypothesis

a) hypothesis

b) preliminary testing

c) graphical representation

c) theoretical basis

d) falsifiability

        4.   Method

                   4.1. Essence

                        a) interviews

                        b) historical conflicts in the Balkans

I. Structure and Methodology:

1.      Observation Abstract

The purpose of this research is to present alternative hypotheses to a puzzling political incident in the Balkans.  Two former Yugoslav republics, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia have very similar political, economic and cultural backgrounds but in the beginning of the 1990s war erupted in Bosnia and Herzegovina but not in Macedonia.  The main goal of this essay is to determine the viability of each hypothesis presented as to why there was a war in the former but not in the latter case.  More specifically, the outcome of the research is expected to show which one of these hypothesis is the most pervasive and appears to be underscoring the events most clearly.  Considering that all three hypotheses are correlated to the cases to a certain extent, this research will seek the element that was different and will isolate it as the most likely sufficient condition for the escalation of conflict from within a country to war between countries.

1.1. Setting the puzzle:

At first glance, the peoples of former Yugoslavia appear as similar as they could be.  They all speak Slavic Languages, Serbo-Croatian and Macedonian (the latter is akin to Bulgarian), and indeed use the Cyrillic alphabet (common to Slavic peoples in this region) as well as the phonetically transcribed Latin alphabet (in Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia).  Furthermore, all the republics within former Yugoslavia had followed common political and economic development and had a relatively similar representation of religions.  As communism began to collapse in Europe in late 1989 Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia decided to secede from the Yugoslav Federation.  In the following couple of years, war erupted in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina but not in Macedonia and Slovenia.  Montenegro allied more closely with Serbia, the dominant republic in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY).

It is puzzling why peoples that have very similar linguistic, religious, cultural and even political heritage would dramatically split along certain social cleavages that would ultimately lead to war in one location and not in a neighbouring one. Why did Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina erupt in ethnic violence while Macedonia and particularly Slovenia remained almost entirely untouched by such conflict? Admittedly, Macedonia experienced ethnic turmoil after 1999, as the Albanian minority (constituting 24% of the population, according to the World Factbook) mobilized in response to Serbian action in the region of Kosovo, neighbouring Macedonia.  Still, the point remains that there was no war in Macedonia and even though tensions have not been completely quelled, the atmosphere is peaceful at present.

 Why did war not erupt in different parts of what used to be the same country?  The importance of this question is great because it demands an explanation for an issue involving almost identical inputs, which produce dramatically different outcomes with the end result being war and the lack thereof.   This, in turn, will have both regional and universal implications in explaining conflict.  If the most fundamental dynamic that causes conflict can be isolated with a convincing level of certainty, it will be possible to avoid future conflicts by manipulating that particular underlying variable.  A significant gap in the theoretical literature will be filled in case such a sufficient condition is recognized.  The potential normative and policy effects of being able to do that are enormous.  It is clear that any finding can only be relative to a context, as it is impossible to mechanically replicate conditions from one system into another.  Studying cases that overwhelmingly reveal similar conditions would ensure the practical applicability of the findings.

1.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina:

(Map of the current division of Former SFRY with highlighted Bosnia and Herzegovina)

Bosnia and Herzegovina erupted in war with Serbia in April 1992, which lasted

until the Dayton agreement of 21 November 1995 The Bosnian Serbs attacked the Muslim population in a conflict that led to an excess of 200,000 dead and confirmed 20, 741 missing persons, according to The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/8D1538DE0942506EC1256C05004C5383/$File/BOSNIA.pdf?OpenElement).  In its 2001 annual report, the ICRC also states that 2, 498 people have been traced, of whom 300 were alive and 2,198 were confirmed dead.  Additionally, 867 persons were confirmed dead without knowledge of their remains' whereabouts.  A total of 17, 376 are still being searched for, but what is substantially more important is that the Bosnian war left 518, 252 internally displaced persons (IDPs) within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including not only Bosniaks but Croats and Serbs.  In 2001 the IRC spent a total of Sfr. 9,551,547 or $6,357,103 to maintain their mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The secession movement of 1990-1991 had first thrust the Serb controlled JNA (Yugoslavian Peoples Army) to war with Slovenia which lasted only a few weeks and involved confiscation of military equipment and the destruction of infrastructure.  Then Serbs in Kraina, Croatia wanted to declare independence and join the republic of Serbia.  Once this was refused, they barricaded their territories and the JNA attacked Croatian forces.  Bosnia and Herzegovina is positioned between Croatia and Serbia. Since there were large and dispersed groups of Croats and Serbs throughout Bosnia, the war soon spilled over to that republic.  The UN and the EU reacted inadequately as the UNPROFOR was set up only to monitor and not directly to prevent hostilities.  In March 1995 the group numbered 38,599 military personnel, including 684 United Nations military observers; the Force also included 803 civilian police, 2,017 other international civilian staff and 2,615 local staff. (http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unprof_p.htm)

1.3. Macedonia:

Macedonia was largely insulated from the events in the more Northern republics and was debating whether to ally with Serbia. The country was as economically underdeveloped as Bosnia and Herzegovina and its leaders did not believe that they could manage the country alone.  Reluctantly, after a proposed referendum about joining Serbia, the Macedonians seceded from the federation too.  Their military installations were dismantled by the JNA and the country remained practically helpless. Serbia was involved in its Bosnian and Croatian wars and Macedonia was not affected.  When turmoil hit Macedonia in 1999 and then again in 2001, caused by the radical Albanian terrorist movement, it was largely provoked by the spillover of militant tendencies from the adjacent Serbian province of Kosovo.  Just like in the case of Bosnia, the conflict was a spillover from a neighbouring state.  There is a positive correlation between the emergence of military conflict in both republics.  The key is finding the element that was different and produced different end results.  The UN peacekeepers, the UNPREDEP quickly responded to the crisis situation and violence was quelled.  There are large numbers of Albanian refugees in Macedonia and even though the situation is peaceful, the likelihood of resurfacing conflict is still present but muted.

1.      Dependent Variable

The dependent variable in the research topic proposed is the manifestation of military conflict and its extent.  The degrees of conflict in the two republics will be measured by estimating the level of conflict as low, high and ultimate, where there is war between different countries.  This is not a binary variable (conflict/ no conflict), so it would be fairly complicated to isolate and define, since there is not polar variation but one of degree.  For the purposes of this research, military conflict would be defined as group interaction that involves the use of force, causing extensive property damage and loss of life in combat and terrorist acts.  It also expresses a claim for political autonomy, on the one hand, and retaliation on the part of a government on the other, as well as third party intervention. 

The level of the dependent variable can be observed along the lines of this definition, i.e. the number of deaths, the number of internally displaced persons, the foreign troops placement in a country and battles fought, the number of third party troops dispatched, etc.   To support the core cases of Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina a set of control cases will be introduced as demanded by the comparative method.  It is most valid to look at cases within the region because of the background similarities which can be controlled for.  To avoid bias by selecting the cases in such a manner, another set of cases from different locations and time periods will be used.  The control cases used in the research will be those of Northern Ireland, Chechnya, Croatia and the case of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria during the 1980s and the Bulgarian unification with East Rumelia in 1885.

2.      Independent Variables:

The independent variables that will be discussed here correspond to three larger theoretical groups of arguments.  One of them is a domestic political argument (that focuses on ethnic and religious mobilization as a result of curtailed minority rights and political entitlements), the second one is an economic argument (that postulates conflict as a result of strained economic conditions) and the third one is an International Relations argument (which claims that the interplay of geopolitical location, the intervention of an ethnic majority state and the international involvement of third parties tip over conflict into war).

 3.1. "No Place for You Here" Political Entitlement Hypothesis

a) hypothesis: This claims that the distribution of political entitlements to minority groups is a major factor for the mobilization along ethnic, religious and other cultural lines.  This has been observed in both primary cases, as well as in the control cases.  In 1980s Bulgaria the printing of newspapers in Turkish was prohibited, Sinn Fein leaders were jailed in Northern Ireland.  The Serb minority in Kraina, Croatia, was not given local self-governance even though the referendum, granted by the institutional vehicle of "communal associations", turned out in favour of that.  The Croatian Constitutional Court ruled it as illegal.  Also, the Bosnians were never referred to as a separate ethnicity but rather as a religious affiliation by the Yugoslav government.  (Please see appendices #1, #2)

To confirm the assumption of this hypothesis one has to observe asymmetrical criteria of ethnicity, representation in governance, (state-level or local), violated minority rights to freedom of expression, gathering, religious practices, the set up of cultural and educational institutions.  These can be measured by observing legislation, or by attaining the numbers of organizations that promote the minority's cultural or language education, as well as taking into account cases of police brutality and comparing these levels with those for the majority group in the country.  If there is a disparity in the levels of political entitlements to minorities in Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, this hypothesis may be able to explain why conflict in Bosnia transformed to outright war while the one in Macedonia remained localized and was more easily subdued.  The path that leads from the uneven distribution of political entitlements to military conflict goes through the asymmetrical definition of ethnicity for minorities, which is strengthened by political demagoguery, which in turn leads to the resurrection of ethnocentrisms, both within the majority and within the minority.

b) graphical representation:

c) theoretical basis: A theory that could give the reasoning for the above hypothesis is Rational Choice Theory applied to group formation.  This approach is exemplified in the work of Russel Hardin.  He believes that the current massive mobilization of groups, especially ethnic ones could be viewed as emanated in terms of its being oriented toward the rationality of group organization.  People "seem to forgo their personal interests while seeking their group's interests" (Hardin, pg. 180) because they are denied the benefits of group identification and are oppressed. (http://www.geocities.com/hmelberg/papers/980522.htm)

d) falsifiability: This argument could be proven wrong if it is shown that not all cases of minority/ majority conflicts stem out of the issues of political entitlements available to minorities.   That would suggest there is another level of analysis which underlies this element.  It could be established that this line of argumentation for the rise of conflict is only a secondary contributory element to the cause of war.  In essence, this would mean that it becomes an intermediate stage in the mobilization that leads to militant conflict and is a necessary but not a sufficient cause (Copi & Cohen, pg.77) of such conflict. Please see appendices #1, #2.

3.2.   "Pare Nema, Deistvai" Economic Hypothesis

("There is no Money", Act! Macedonian)

a) hypothesis:

This hypothesis explains conflict as a function of the performance of the economy.  According to such an approach war in Yugoslavia resulted from the state of the poorly performing Yugoslavian economy throughout the 1980s.  By 1988 national income had fallen 2.0%, industrial output declined by 1.0%, agricultural output fell by 5.0%, unemployment was at 16.8%and inflation soared at 160% (Please see appendix #3).  Looking at the figures of economic performance one is compelled to believe the crucial importance of that factor, however, inconsistencies persist.  Montenegro and Macedonia were the poorest performing economies in the federation (together with Bosnia) but war took place only in Bosnia.  Furthermore, the industrially better developed republics, Croatia and Slovenia also were engaged by the central SFRY forces.  These will suggest that there must have been another reason underlying the economic motive of the wars.  Still, the economy of the SFRY was rapidly declining throughout the 1980s and some vital sectors, such as agriculture, were experiencing negative growth throughout about half the decade. The system of Market Socialism afforded a relatively stable and prosperous economy in the period prior to 1980 but as a negative externality to the socialist system, asymmetrical developments became pervasive.  The resulting unequal taxation placed confronting interests in a precarious balance which could not be sustained for long.   Please see appendix #3.  As a result of that, the economies of the better-off Yugoslav republics were deprived of their revenues, while the inefficient economies of the poorer republics absorbed the new funding rapidly without improvement.  Furthermore, on 16 July 1990 the Serbian government "unilaterally arranged for an unsecured loan of 28 billion dinars (~$1.8 billion) from the National Bank of Yugoslavia to the Republic of Serbia, which was used to liquidate the debts of Serb enterprises as well as for cash." (Ramet, 55)  This caused a major asymmetry of cash availability to Serbia and no reserves for the rest of the republics in the Federation.

b) graphical representation

c) theoretical basis:  Exacerbated economic conditions as a cause of war have been discussed for a long time.  In fact Sparta engaged in war with the Persian kingdom more than 2000 years ago for economic reasons.  Arguably even nowadays wars are fought to guarantee access to important resources, such as the Persian Gulf War of 1991. Thomas Malthus was one of the earlier thinkers to direct attention to the connection between the scarcity of resources and military conflict.  For Malthusianism war is a natural phenomenon which is a function of the competition for limited goods. 

The situation in former Yugoslavia could easily be viewed in terms of a New-Malthusian paradigm where the richer republics were drained for subsidies to the poorer republics and thus were deprived of their purchasing power and economic well-being.  Realism is also a powerful supporter of such a hypothesis because it focuses on the necessary hostility of international relations and the need for a country to secure its economic and political position over the rest.  A particular theory that deals with Yugoslavia is that of Unitarism, where usually Serbia (but also Croatia) is credited with attempting to monopolize power over the Yugoslav Federation and, in effect, be an undisputed hegemon.

d) falsifiability: This hypothesis can be falsified if it is proven that the decline of market socialism was more of a political event than an economic one, or rather that the economic demise of the system was due to the political structure within which it operated.  When looking at other cases, this hypothesis can be proven of secondary importance because Chechnya would have had no economic incentive to separate from Russia and join Georgia, since the latter was much poorer than the former, so it would make more sense for Chechens to remain within Russia.  Also the fighting in Northern Ireland would not be justified in attempting to adjoin the North with the South on economic grounds because the United Kingdom has a more prosperous economy.  The Turkish minority revolting in Bulgaria in the 1980s could have had a better case in this sense since the Turkish economy was better developed than the Bulgarian one, particularly compared to the regions where this minority lived.  Macedonia and Montenegro were as poor as Bosnia in the late 1980s yet there was war only in Bosnia, and one of the richest republics, Croatia. By using comparative data on the cases in view, one might be able to disprove this hypothesis more substantially.  Also using counterfactual "what if-s" could be helpful. 

3.3. "Across the Border" International Relations Hypothesis:

a) hypothesis:

Internal political problems with minorities within a country are a necessary condition for the initial mobilization of separatist movements, as shown in all cases. This is a parameter that is automatically controlled for because it is present in all cases and this way is held constant by itself.  Economic problems and the creation of "winners" and "losers" is also a reasonable cause for disturbances.  But some cases like these of Montenegro or of Macedonia do not confirm this rule for the causation of military conflict. 

The "Across the Border" hypothesis looks at the other conditions which vary from case to case, to find out what is the sufficient condition for the escalation of conflict to a high level that leads to war.  This hypothesis looks at the interplay of two external political factors and one geopolitical factor.  The dynamic balance of these three elements determines the rise or the lack thereof of local conflict to the point at which it tips over into war.  By looking at other conflicts similar to these in Former Yugoslavia, both historically and topically, one can find out what levels of the three parameters cause the escalation of conflict into war and what levels do not. 

The three intervening variables this hypothesis considers are: 

* the intervention of the country where the majority of the population belongs to the same ethnicity as the minority that revolts in the troubled state

* the intervention of international forces

* the adjacency of the minority to the country where that same ethnic group is a majority. 

The varying levels of these three elements determine the extent of the conflict and whether there is war or not. 

b) preliminary testing:

When applied to the 8 cases, 6 within the region (2 of which in

different historic periods) and 2 in distant locations, will establish whether the hypothesis has more than local and contemporary explanatory power.  In order to find out what combination of factors contributes to the dependent variable, it is necessary to examine each one individually. 

The geopolitical factor is the easiest to confirm.  If the minority in the troubled state looks for help from the majority group in an adjacent state, then it is more likely they will be granted support by that state and it is more likely that it will go to war with the state where the minority is.  Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia were two such cases for Serbia. So were Ireland and Chechnya.  In Macedonia the spillover Kosovan Albanian conflict was not directed toward Albania, the country where this group is a majority.  The Kosovan Albanians misplaced their attempts to rally support as they directed them to Macedonia, where the Albanians are a minority, so they could not achieve support from the majority country, Albania.  When the Turkish minority in Bulgaria in the 1980s revolted, its territories were not adjacent to Turkey and that country did not intervene militarily. 

The intervention of the country where the population is ethnically the same as the minority of the rowdy state could be observed in terms of military equipment transfers, troops dispatching, financial and political support, rhetoric in the media in support of intervention, asylum for minority rebellion leaders and the like. The cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia show the highest degree of support and intervention and, as a result, a high level of conflict. The Bulgarian unification with East Rumelia of 1885 shows equally strong support but conflict was minimal because of the favourable international climate. In Chechnya the separatist movement had Georgia for support.  The Macedonian Albanian case and that of the Turkish minority uprising in 1980s Bulgaria did not meet that condition because the minorities did not reach out to the countries where these ethnicities form the majority. The Macedonian independence movement of the late 19^th century was formally resolved with the treaty of Bucharest of 1913, which split the contested territory in three further exacerbating the multiple interests that had caused the 2 Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913.

The international involvement would mainly be construed in terms of peace forces setting into the regions of fighting (UN, NATO) or historically, a Great Powers intervention.  This intervention also varies in degree from humanitarian aid, through subsidies and trade embargoes, to the stationing of troops.  Whether this involvement is on the side of the minority or on the side of the majority, it still makes one of the local parties fight more zealously as shown in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Chechnya, or Northern Ireland.  The international community was against the Albanian insurgence in Macedonia even though it supported it across the border in Kosovo.

The comparative data of the research thus conducted show that the combination that causes heightened military conflict is as follows:

1. High involvement and intervention of the country where the majority of the population belongs to the same ethnicity as the minority that revolts in the troubled state. 
2. High level of international involvement. 
3. The geographical region inhabited by that minority is adjacent to the country where the same ethnicity is a majority.

The highest correlation between an intervening variable and the dependent variable is shown by (3.) the geographical position of the minority adjacent to the state where the same ethnicity is a majority.  In half of the cases, the majority country intervened on the side of the rebelling minority.  There was international intervention in the in 5 of the 7 cases and there was war in 3 of them.

From this preliminary test it appears clear why there was war in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and currently in Chechnya and not in Macedonia.  The frequency with which the three elements appear in all of the cases considered determine the dynamic matrix that can explain the existence of low and high conflict and the ultimate degree of conflict- war. The cases in which there was war share the exact same dynamics. While the countries that did not go all the way to war showed the exact opposite dynamics; these were the cases of Macedonia and the Turkish minority in 1980s Bulgaria.  The decisive factor which was totally different in these two cases was the Early foreign intervention in the conflict.  Subsidiary factors are the lack of physical proximity to the majority state rallied for support and the intervention of that country.

c) graphical representation

d) theoretical basis

This hypothesis derives its inspiration from a European Union integrational theory called "Europe of the Regions" (http://www.cor.eu.int/home.htm).  This claims that since people on the two sides of a border may have more in common than people in different parts of the same country, stable economic ties across borders would bring about peace and prosperity by creating cross-cutting cleavages. 

It is argued here that this theoretical approach can be used to explain the absolute opposite effect to integration, separatism.  In essence, the best explanation will be an International Relations interdependence theory that suggests the interaction between actors on the global arena influences the decision making of countries. 

Additionally Nation Statism persisted throughout the 19^th and the 20^th centuries and was the basis of the formation of all of the states on the Balkans at that time.  This also viewed in an International Relations perspective can explain the interaction between local and global forces and the resulting levels of conflict.  

d) falsifiability

            This hypothesis can be falsified if a case can be selected in which the three intervening variables show the same dynamics but do not end in war.  Or, conversely speaking, the opposite can be observed, where another combination of the intervening variables does lead to war.  

4.  Method

To test the validity of the three hypotheses, a comparative method will be used.  In depth cross-time and cross-space comparison is the most adequate method to be applied to these cases as it will rule out inconsistencies and will show more convincingly the variables that are similar and those that are different in the research, thus showing what was the sufficient condition that escalates conflict into war.  Due to constraints of logistic and temporal character, this research would have a somewhat limited scope, extending only as far back as 1885.  The cases considered would be seven and the main cases of research would be two.  By employing a smaller "n" research method, one would screen out immaterial or irrelevant independent and intermediate variables, thus making the task more manageable and precise.  Additionally it will be easier to control several variables while studying the variation of a particular variable, since there is a number of similarities in the cases considered.  Another benefit to comparing a smaller number of cases that display greater similarities is the avoidance of indiscriminate plurality of causes.  Another compelling reason for the use of such a number of cases is the specificity of the hypotheses suggested and the number of actual conflicts of this kind in existence.

 Biased selection on the dependant variable could easily be avoided in my research by employing the method's embedded embryonic statistic approach.  That is, provided clear definitions are given to what is to be observed and how the findings will be interpreted, this method can be an indispensable tool to solving complex phenomena. In other words, the most often appearing hypothetical variable would be the most viable to be a general underlying cause of the dependent variable.

In regards to Lijphart's chart of typology of scientific methods, the current research would pursue the following pattern (Lijphart, pg. 452):

4.1 Alternative Method

It may be argued that a statistical regression method, looking at a much broader case load would bring about more results of comparative value.  Because of restrictions of financial and knowledge-base nature, the regression method cannot be applied at present.  However, I would like to propose that a larger "N" series test be run to confirm or disconfirm the findings of the current research.  A counterargument to that is that extensiveness does not guarantee relevance, i.e. not all violent conflicts in the world pertain to the same reasons and it is a futile endeavour to compare widely varying cases. 

Yet by looking at a larger number of cases may bring about more clarity regarding the causes of conflicts in more universal terms.  However, this is not the immediate purpose of the present research, which attempts to discover the causes of the ex-Yugoslavian wars of the 1990s.

4.2. Data Collection

                        a) historical comparisons of the conflicts in the Balkans will be presented. These would especially focus on violent conflicts that have among their goals claims on territory, as these would be most relevant for the issues at hand. These would look for elements of the three hypotheses present in each of the conflicts observed.  Thus a conclusion of rudimentary statistical validity may be drawn.  Relevant data sets to be observed are economic parametres, death rates in violent conflicts as defined before, statistics on ethnicity, religious and political affiliation and others.

                        b) personal interviews will be conducted with natives to the areas in question.  This would provide a valuable perspective based on the viewpoints of the insiders to the conflict.  This will act as a corrective to the often impersonal and highly theoretical approaches that outside analysts may develop.  It will provide a direct illustration of the motivations of the actors in the conflicts.

       5. Appendix:  

 #1

 Proportion of ethnic Muslims, Serbs, Croats, Yugoslavs and other nationalities in Bosnia- Herzegovina 1948-1991)

From: Ante Markotic, "Demografski aspect promenja u nacionalnoj strukturi stanovnistva Bosne I Hercegovine" Sveske, Nos 16-17 (1986), p 292; and Tanjug (30 April 1991), trans. In Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), 1 May 1991, p.53as referenced by Ramet, S. Balkan Babel, pg 120

#2

The following graphical representation of the above data provides a more readily

discernable visualization of these trends:

#3

Yugoslav Rates of Growth 1948-1981 (in percentages)

Statisticki godisnjak Jugoslavije (Statistical Yearbook of Yugoslavia) 1945-64,

1965, 1976, 1986, as referenced in Ivekovic, Ivan, Ethnic and Regional Conflicts in Yugoslavia and Transcaucasia, pg. 39

Annual Economic Growth Rates, 1981-1988 (in percentages)

Ramet, Sabrina, Social Currents in Eastern Europe: The Sources and Consequences of the Great Transformation, 2^nd ed. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1995, pp. 33-35 as referenced in Ramet, Sabrina, Balkan Babel, pg. 50

6. Annotated Bibliography:

A: Books

1. Croci, Osvaldo & MacLean, K., Brian, "The New Totalitarian Society and the Destruction of Yugoslavia", Legas, Ottawa, 1999, from Society for Slovene Studies
2. Ivekovic, Ivan, "Ethnic and Regional Conflicts in Yugoslavia and Transcaucasia: A Political Economy of Contemporary Ethnonational Mobilization", Longo Editore Ravenna, Italy, 2000, from Europe and the Balkans International Network
3. Milosevic, Slobodan, "Godine Raspleta", 4^th ed, Beogradski Izdavacko-Graficki, Zavod, Belgrade, SFRY, 1989
4. Ramet, Sabrina, "Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milosevic", 4^th ed., Westview Press, Colorado, USA, Oxford, UK, 2002, from Society for Slovene Studies
5. Ramet, P., Sabrina, "Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise", Routledge, London & New York, 1999, from Society for Slovene Studies

B: Book Reviews

1. Emil Vlajkl, review of The New Totalitarian Society and the Destruction of Yugoslavia by Osvaldo Croci and Brian K. MacLean, Society for Slovene Studies, http://www.arts.ualberta.ca/~ljubljan/bookreviews/Vlajki.pdf
2. Meier, Viktor, review of Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise by Sabrina P. Remet, Society for Slovene Studies, http://www.arts.ualberta.ca/~ljubljan/bookreviews/Meier.pdf
3. Rogel, Carole review of Balkan Babel: the Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the War in Kosovo, 3^rd ed., by Sabrina P. Ramet,  Society for Slovene Studies, http://www.arts.ualberta.ca/~ljubljan/bookreviews/Ramet.pdf

C: Articles

Source: London Review of Books, www.lrb.co.uk

1. Harding, Jeremy, "Kosovo's Big Men", LRB, Vol. 21 #3 Feb 4^th 1999, http://www.lrb.co.uk/v21/n03/hard01_.html
2. Harding, Jeremy, "Short Cuts", LRB, Vol. 23 #14, Jul 19^th 2001, http://www.lrb.co.uk/v23/n14/hard01_.html

D:  Dissertations

Source: University Microfiche (UMI), http://wwwlib.umi.com/dissertations/gateway

1. Bozic-Robertson, Agnza. "The Politicization of Ethnicity as a Prelude to Ethnopolitical Conflict: Croatia and Serbia in Former Yugoslavia" Ph.D. diss., Western Michigan University, 2001, http://wwwlib.umi.com/dissertations/fullcit/3017306

Abstract: This interdisciplinary research develops a framework or a model for the study of the politicization of ethnicity, a process that transforms peaceful ethnic conflict into violent inter-ethnic conflict.  Ethnic entrepreneurs are the actors and the mass media and political rhetoric are their tools.

2. De la Haye, Jos, "Missed Opportunities in Conflict Management: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina (1987-1996)" Ph.D. diss., Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (Belgium), 2001, http://wwwlib.umi.com/dissertations/fullcit/f98225

Abstract:  The Bosnian conflict informs a discussion of opportunities missed or taken.  Between April 1992 and November 1995, the Bosnian war left 200 000 dead and half of the population displaced.  The terrible violence came under the scrutiny of the international community, but well-intentioned initiatives clearly lacked strength and credibility, which eventually led to the failure to prevent the conflict.

3. Devic, Ana, "The Forging of Socialist Nationalism and its Alternatives: Social and Political Context and Intellectual Criticism in Yugoslavia between the mid-1960s and 1992" Ph.D. diss., University of California, San Diego, 2000, http://wwwlib.umi.com/dissertations/fullcit/9975880

Abstract: This study examines the influence of intellectuals and political elites on the forms of ethno-national and cultural identities from the mid-1960s until the country's violent disintegration. Yugoslavia was characterized by a variety of non-ethnic solidarities and because of the simmering grassroots social discontent, the organizers of territorial re-configuration of the country required the input of intellectual elites in disseminating the ideas of ethno-national self-determination.

4. Grigorova-Mincheva, Lyubov, "Ethnoterritorial Separatist Movements and Spillover Crises: The Balkans in the 1990s" Ph.D. diss., University of Maryland College Park, 2000, http://wwwlib.umi.com/dissertations/fullcit/9985319

Abstract: This dissertation examines Kosovar and Bosnian spillover crises in the 1990s as a form of regionalization of violent ethnic conflict by transnational kindred groups.  Ethnoterritorial Separatist Movements (ETSMs) are the agents of these crises.

5. Keridis, Dimitris, "The Foreign Policy of Nationalism: The Case of Serbia (1986-1995) and Greece (1991-1995)" Ph.D. diss., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Tufts University), 1998, http://wwwlib.umi.com/dissertations/fullcit/9927430

Abstract: This is a study in foreign policy formation and the politics of ethno-nationalism.  The analysis focuses on non-material factors: nationalist ideology and culture put to service of material interests, political power.

E: Government Documents:

1. Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook 2002", http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html  
2. Country reports on Human Rights Practices for 2000, Vol.2 JC 571 U48a 2000:2/ GSSI
3. United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence, "Hearings on U.S. actions regarding Iranian arms shipments into Bosnia : hearings before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, One Hundred Fourth Congress, second session", SuDocs Call No. Y 4.IN 8/19:S.HRG. 104-786, 05. 23. 1996, http://www.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/waisgate.cgi?WAISdocID=87391532252+5+1+0&WAISaction=retrieve
4. United States. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs, "U.S. policy toward Bosnia and the Balkans : hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives", SuDocs Call No. Y 4.F 76/1:B 65, 05.11. 1994, http://www.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/waisgate.cgi?WAISdocID=87391532252+9+1+0&WAISaction=retrieve
5. EU Council of the Regions (CoR) : Council of the Regions: http://www.cor.eu.int/home.htm

F: United Nations and Affiliated Agencies:

1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, www.nato.int
2. UN Confidence Restoration Operation, UNCRO, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/uncro.htm
3. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR:  http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.htm?tbl=STATISTICS&id=3d075d374&page=statistics
4. UN Preventive Deployment Force, UNPREDEP, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unpredep.htm
5. UN Protection Force, UNPROFOR, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unprofor.htm

And

    http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unprof_p.htm

6.   International Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC):

http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/8D1538DE0942506EC1256C05004C5383/$File/BOSNIA.pdf?OpenElement

G: Newspapers:

1.      New York Times (New York) Published: 10.29.2002 , Late Edition - Final , Section A , Column 4 , Page 6,  World Briefing | Europe: Bosnia And Herzegovina: Nationalists Sworn In, Agence France Presse

2.      New York times (New York), Publisehd, 10.28.2002, Late Edition-Final, Section A, Page 25, Column 2,  What I Learned in Bosnia, Paddy Ashdown, NYT

H:  Interviews:

1. Jerkov, Mia, native of Split, Croatia, Croatian National Womens Volleyball

team, interview by author, 10 November, 2002, Berkeley, CA

2. Sahmanovic, Alma, native of Sarajevo, student, interview by author, 14 October, 2002, Berkeley, CA, internet session.